PART IV: WORKING WITH INFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGE Though the distinction is far from neat, let us distinguish between the collection of knowledge and the analysis of knowledge.. Whereas Part III discussed how to increase our stocks of ideas and information, Part IV discusses the mental operations that we ought (or ought not) apply to the stocks of knowledge that we possess, in order to draw out the meaning of the information that you have in hand. One group of analytic methods are deductive, procedures that use only the information that you have created, plus a set of rules that are determined in advance. This group includes classification, and the application of logic and mathematics (including some statistics). The other group of procedures includes explanation, causal determination, and extension of the results to new situations. This latter group depends upon the analyst's use of additional knowledge and judgment, whereas the former group is limited to the material at hand. Classification, discussed in Chapter 41, often is an important and difficult process. It deserves more credit than it gets. Together with the related operation of measurement, it molds the raw material of observation into forms that we can analyze. Classification is a kind of deductive method; it uses the characteristics of each item to be classified, plus the rules established for the classification, to determine the handling of each item. Chapter 42 explains the nature and use of the main deductive methods -- logic and mathematics -- to draw new and useful conclusions from existing information, including information about the classification of various elements we are working with. The various processes of interpreting the associations observed in the information in hand -- explanation, prediction, causal attribution, and others -- overlap each other to some extent, but they also differ. Figure IV-1 diagrams the connections among them. Chapter 43 discusses the processes of explanation and the determination of causality. Both processes begin with the raw information about the relationship between two sets of facts -- say, data on the movement of bathing suit sales and on the number of weddings -- and choose the additional interpretations (if any) to attach to that relationship and that particular set of facts. FIGURE IV-1 Chapter 44 discusses the extension of the interpretation to new situations not included in the original information. If you have just learned that your new fertilizer will increase the growth of soybeans in the Midwest, should you conclude that the same thing will happen in the Atlantic states and in India? And of course prediction of the future is a crucial extension of the information we have available from the past. Will the Orioles do as well in the second half of the season as in the first half? Chapter 44 provides a set of principles for forecasting accurately. It also points out the main causes of error in prediction of economic and social phenomena. Chapter 44 also discusses and analyzes the concept of causality, which is sometimes difficult to determine, and sometimes difficult to interpret. Chapter 45 discusses various pitfalls that may ensnare our thinking, and especially our judgments. There are lots of different ways we can befoul our thinking -- logical fallacies, linguistic traps, faulty conclusions due to insufficient information-gathering, and uneven attention to the information that is available, among others. Unbiased and error-free thinking is impossible in principle, and perfect rationality is not even a good standard of comparison. Chapter 45 offers some guides around the pitfalls so as to arrive more closely at mental clarity. A person can take in only a tiny fraction of the sensations and information that are available and relevant to our activities. And our machinery for processing the information impinging upon us cranks out crude approximations at best. Therefore, the state of our knowledge and judgments is necessarily imperfect, and almost necessarily it is systematically biased in one direction or another. A variety of factors -- notably the traps embedded in the language we employ, and the influence of our hopes and fears upon our judgments -- often corrupt our judgmental processes so that we do not even come close to the feasible quality of thinking. Chapter 47 contains suggestions about how we can improve our judgments. Habits and self-discipline are the subject of Chapter 48. They may be the most important learning we do, because they control the learning of other subjects. If a child lacks the discipline to do homework or practice shooting baskets left- handed, that child will not get to be a skilled practitioner of algebra or basketball. It came as something of a surprise to me that so much of Part IV is drawn from my text on research methods. The techniques that are appropriate for collecting and analyzing scientific data are also appropriate for the data that we work with in our everyday lives, both private and public. And the errors in our everyday judgments stem from the pitfalls that are much the same as the obstacles that must be overcome if a scientific study is to be be valid. This similarity between valid scientific and everyday thinking has been emphasized recently by psychologists who study "cognitive thought" -- that is, the processes with which we infer conclusions from the data that impinge upon our lives (e. g. Nisbett and Ross, 1980. [Schacter?]). This is one of the welcome converging movements among the branches of knowledge. Cognitive psychologists also discern cost-benefit evaluations in our everyday thinking which are similar to the cost-benefit evaluations of obtaining more or better information which are a central feature of managerial economics. The students of mental disorder who group under the label "cognitive therapy" also see cost-benefit processes at work. This is another such movement of convergence. Page # thinking part-4## 3-3-4d